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Abstract: The rapid proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as smart meters and water 
valves, into industrial critical infrastructures and control systems has put stringent performance and 
scalability requirements on modern Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. 
While cloud computing has enabled modern SCADA systems to cope with the increasing amount 
of data generated by sensors, actuators and control devices, there has been a growing interest 
recently to deploy edge datacenters in fog architectures to secure low-latency and enhanced security 
for mission-critical data. However, fog security and privacy for SCADA-based IoT critical 
infrastructures remains an under-researched area. To address this challenge, this contribution 
proposes a novel security “toolbox” to reinforce the integrity, security, and privacy of SCADA-based 
IoTcritical infrastructure at the fog layer. The toolbox incorporates a key feature: a cryptographic-
based access approach to the cloud services using identity-based cryptography and signature 
schemes at the fog layer. We present the implementation details of a prototype for our proposed 
Secure Fog-based Platform (SeFoP) and provide performance evaluation results to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of the proposed platform in a real-world scenario. These results can pave the way 
towards the development of more secured and trusted SCADA-based IoT critical infrastructure, 
which is essential to counter cyber threats against next-generation critical infrastructure and 
industrial control systems. The results from the experiments demonstrate a superior performance 
of SeFoP, which is around 2.8 seconds when adding 5 virtual machines (VMs), 3.2 seconds when 
adding 10 VMs, and 112 seconds when adding 1000 VMs compared to Multi-Level user Access 
Control (MLAC) platform.  
Keywords: Fog computing; Secured platform; IoT; SCADA systems; Critical Infrastructure; 
mission-critical data. 
 
1. Introduction 
The adoption of cloud computing to support business operations has increased remarkably due 
to the on-demand pricing model; which has led to reducing the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) for 
private data centers. Despite the increasing usage of cloud computing for dynamic provisioning of 
resources and pay-per-use on demand access, there are still unresolved issues such as the 
requirement of high capacity client access links, variable latency, lack of mobility support, security 
concerns and location-awareness [1][2]. In particular, applications such as real-time monitoring 
industrial automation (Industry 4.0), sensor and actuators networks, and intelligent transportation 
systems are too latency-sensitive to be deployed on cloud infrastructures. Generally, cloud data 
centers are located near the core network and in places where operating cost is lowest. Thus, 
applications and services might suffer unacceptable round-trip latency, when data is transmitted 
from/to end devices, to/from the remote cloud data center through multiple gateways. Fog 
computing is an emerging paradigm that can address this challenge by offering computing resources 
and services at the edge of the network. Fog computing puts a substantial amount of communication, 
control, storage and management at the edge of a network as opposed to establishing dedicated 
channels to a more centralized remote cloud infrastructure. This approach reduces service latency, 
improves quality of service and provides a superior experience to end-users [2][3].  
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used for the control, 
monitoring and automation of industrial processes and Critical Infrastructure (CI) systems. 
Centralized SCADA systems were first introduced in 1960 for CI monitoring and control purposes 
[4]. The use of SCADA technology has evolved and is expected to grow substantially up from €188 
million in 2007 towards €300 million in 2020 [5]. These systems were vendor-controlled and strictly 
isolated from other systems [6][7][8] focusing specially on collecting the necessary log-field data 
using industrial Distributed Control Systems (DCS), which recorded the data and sent every reading 
to the control room to (re)act accordingly. In case of emergency, a DCS message is generated and is 
raised as a critical alarm to inform the control room operator to react to the situation accordingly. CIs 
are vulnerable to cyber-attacks and emerge from a wide range of prospective perpetrators: state-
sponsored terrorism, espionage and sabotage, malevolent ‘‘hacktivists,’’ or even disgruntled insiders. 
Cyber-attacks against SCADA-based IoT CIs are fueled by the high value and intrinsic vulnerabilities 
of these infrastructures, and this has led governments and security agencies to look for more effective 
ways to secure them [9]. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI) has been issuing security guidance on protecting CI facilities [8]. 
Though IoT inherits the same monitoring requirements from Cloud computing, the related 
challenges are however further amplified by the volume, variety, and velocity characteristics of IoT 
data.  
It has been observed that the protection of CIs against cyber-attacks hinges on the security of the 
associated ICT infrastructure. One notable instance was the 2010 cyber-attack on Iran's Natanz 
nuclear facility through the highly modified Stuxnet malware that was responsible for causing 
substantial damage [10]. In another example, the HAVEX malware targeted industrial control 
systems by attaching itself to software updates distributed by control system manufacturers. When 
downloaded, it collects information from control devices and sends the information back to the 
remote attacker for analysis [11]. Thus, an increasing number of research initiatives are actively 
seeking advanced security mechanisms to protect CI assets and networks. For example, the 
PROTECT Centre [12], established in 2011, conducts research into critical infrastructure computer 
technology and protection. The security solutions for CI go beyond the traditional deployment of 
firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). They include strong user authentication, 
Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), system and protocol hardening, and trusted systems, among many 
others [13]. Since each service requires various conflicting types of security objectives such as 
authorization and authentication, current models often fail to provide an effectively abstracted 
security layer to accommodate the different authorization requirements for each service. Hence 
further research is warranted to investigate how to effectively integrate security and role-based 
authentication support [14]. The IoT is becoming a major source of big data, generating huge amounts 
of streamed information from many interconnected nodes, which have to be stored, processed, and 
presented in an efficient and easily interpretable fashion [15]. The amount of data generated by the 
number of IoT devices integrated into industrial control systems is expanding at an ever-increasing 
rate; which means that modern SCADA systems must have the ability to manage thousands of times 
more data than traditional SCADA systems [16]. For example, in large smart grids, the amount of 
data that is generated by the geographically distributed smart meters is so massive that moderate 
cloud computing resources cannot cope with. In this regard, Cisco determined that “today's cloud 
models are not designed for the volume, variety, and velocity of data that IoT generates.” A direct 
upload of all data generated from IoT devices to the cloud for storage, processing and analysis would 
need unfathomable measures of data transfer capacity. There exist various studies that aim to address 
cloud computing issues for industrial IoT-Based SCADA systems [17][18][19][20]. Moreover, private 
customer data originating from ubiquitous devices (such as smart phones) are usually stored in cloud 
infrastructures; which not only attract intruders but also stakeholders, such as service providers and 
cloud operators who are interested to use this data for their own benefits (e.g. advertising) [21][22]. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Report [23] on IoT urged businesses to adopt best practices to 
address consumer privacy concerns and security risks. It warns that smart devices are involved in 
harvesting huge amount of personal information and that they are exposed to a variety of potential 
security threats, such as unauthorized access and misuse of personal information. 
Fog computing can help to address some of the aforementioned issues in modern cloud-based 
SCADA systems [2][4][17][19][20]. For instance, Fog computing facilitates the on-site data storage 
and analysis of time-sensitive heterogeneous data by reducing the amount of data stored and 
transmitted to the cloud; thus, providing better delay performance. However, Fog computing is a 
non-trivial extension of cloud computing, and it has been proposed in the context of the IoT. Thus, 
most cloud computing security and privacy issues are inherited in fog computing.  Also, due to the 
underlying differences between cloud computing and fog computing, security solutions proposed 
for cloud computing may not suit fog services which are available to end users at the edge of 
networks. This might hinder the integration of Fog paradigm into the SCADA-based IoT Critical 
Infrastructure.  
In this paper we present a novel end-to-end security approach as a part of a security toolbox to 
reinforce the integrity, security, and privacy of SCADA-based IoT Critical Infrastructure at the fog 
layer. The initial design and key aspects of the ‘security toolbox’ in the context of a centralized SOA-
based SCADA systems have been described in a previous work [14], whereby the authors proposed 
an open platform enabling the integration of cloud computing into SOA based SCADA systems. The 
contribution in [14] also identified the key elements required to enforce security and integrity as a 
SOA-based service on these systems. This paper amends and extends the security toolbox to reinforce 
the integrity, security, and privacy of IoT-based SCADA systems at the fog layer.  
The present contribution differs from previous work through the following two main aspects: 
(i) The proposal of a cryptographic-based access approach for the cloud services using identity-
based cryptography and identity-based signature schemes at the fog layer. To our 
knowledge, this is the first contribution that aimed to explore the usage of identity-based 
cryptography and identity-based signature schemes within the fog layer. 
(ii) Implementation and evaluation of the proposed Secure Fog-based Platform (SeFoP) 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the motivations behind 
this work and highlights the research problems that this contribution aims to address. Section 3 
provides a literature survey and a summary of earlier contributions. Section 4 presents our approach 
to secure a SCADA-based IoT critical infrastructure, and Section 5 details our proposed fog-based 
cryptographic solution using identity-based cryptography and identity-based signature. Section 6 
outlines the implementation details of the proposed key authentication mechanism while Section 7 
presents and discusses preliminary evaluation results. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and 
indicates the direction of our future work.  
2. Research Motivations and Problem Statement 
2.1. Research Motivations 
Modern SCADA systems are adopting the emerging IoT paradigm and commercial cloud computing 
services for the monitoring and protection of critical applications associated with industrial control 
systems, smart grids, and other CIs [24][25]. As a result, the threats posed by the expansion of the 
cyber vulnerability landscape have increased dramatically in terms of potential, frequency, and 
impact [7].  
In smart industrial systems such as manufacturing, oil and gas, eHealth systems, and 
transportation, fast response-time is crucial to improve service level and increase safety. In fact, a few 
milliseconds matter when it comes to shutting down a power plant or restoring electrical services. 
Analyzing extremely latency-sensitive data close to the smart objects that collected the data is one of 
the merits of Fog computing. For SCADA-based IoT critical infrastructures, this paradigm can help 
in providing better delay performance and can potentially make a difference between averting an 
imminent disaster and assuming the consequences of a cascading system failure. However, by 
embracing the fog computing paradigm, fog-enabled IoT-based SCADA systems become the subject 
of a new breed of cyber threats and attacks. This work is motivated by the fact that addressing 
security and privacy concerns at the fog layer could enable fog computing to provide not only 
additional computational resources, but also adequate level of security to thwart cyber-attacks 
against SCADA-based IoT critical infrastructures. At the same time, we acknowledge that special 
care should be exercised to ensure that any proposed security/privacy mechanism should not 
compromise system performance and scalability requirements. Failure to do so will negate the gain 
brought by fog computing in terms of lower response time and latency in support for real-time 
SCADA-based IoT critical services.   
2.2. Problem Statement  
Lee et al. [26] suggested that in the near future, IoT fog computing is expected to collect and 
process deeply personal information originated from millions of IoT devices. While existing security 
solutions can be used to address some threats, there are other issues that pertain to fog computing 
environments and which pose unique challenges for security researchers and practitioners [21]. For 
example, authentication is an essential requirement for protecting IoT data both in transit and at rest. 
Unfortunately, many IoT devices are not equipped with enough memory and CPU power to perform 
cryptographic operations that are required by most of today’s authentication protocols. It is however 
possible to migrate the expensive processing and storage from the IoT device to the fog layer. For 
example, a security toolbox can be deployed as a service over the fog computing platform to enable 
the resource-constrained IoT devices execute their authentication service and make use of other 
security services. This however opens new attack vectors against the fog computing platform such as 
fog node-compromised attack [26]. In summary, without deploying proper security and privacy-
preserving mechanisms, the adoption and diffusion of fog computing in IoT-based SCADA systems 
will remain restricted. Accordingly, this contribution aims to address the following research question: 
What mechanisms can be put in place to effectively enhance the security and privacy of cloud-
assisted IoT-based SCADA systems, while not compromising performance and scalability 
requirements?  
3. Related Work 
Modern industrial cyber physical systems often depend on SCADA systems to control and 
monitor their infrastructure. They are considered smart industrial systems due to their association 
with IoT, machine learning, artificial intelligence and Cloud computing [19][27]. Moreover, IoT is 
becoming a main source of big data, generating an enormous amount of information, flowing 
through many connected nodes. This information has to be stored, processed, and presented in an 
effective, efficient, and easily interpretable form. In principle, fog services can be positioned between 
cloud-based SCADA systems and the cloud to enable a wide range of benefits, such as enhanced 
bandwidth utilization, reduced latency, enhanced security, heterogeneity and geophysical 
distribution. However, research on integrating fog computing into IoT-based SCADA systems is still 
in its infancy. We divide the study of existing literature into a fog-based and SCADA-based solutions.  
3.1 Fog-based solutions 
Recent work has shown how fog complements and extends cloud computing, emphasizing fog’s 
relevance to several verticals within the IoT and Big Data space [28][29][30][31]. Bonami et al. [30] 
presented a high-level description of fog software architecture, articulating the different 
technological components necessary to implement the fog paradigm. Hong et al. [32] proposed the 
concept of mobile fog, a high-level programing model to support latency-sensitive and large-scale 
IoT applications that are geospatially distributed. Do et al., [33] analyzed the joint resource allocation 
and carbon footprint problem in fog computing. Authors in [34] proposed a conceptual model to 
tackle the issues of resource prediction, resource estimation and reservation, and pricing for new and 
existing IoT customers. Dubey et al. [35] proposed a service-oriented architecture based on fog 
computing to perform data mining and analysis on raw data collected from various wearable sensors 
used for telehealth applications. Zao et al. [36] developed a brain computer interaction application 
using fog computing where data is pre-processed on the fog aiming to reduce latency and bandwidth 
utilization. The authors in [17] explored fog computing capabilities for smart grids. They proposed a 
reference model that integrates fog computing concepts into smart grids.  
3.2 SCADA-based solutions 
Classical SCADA systems are already lacking proper security and privacy preserving 
mechanisms. However, due to their integration with new complex architectures, enabled by the cloud 
computing paradigm and IoT, they are becoming the subject of new security threats. Each point in 
the SCADA network is a potential entry point –this is in part due to the fact that little work has been 
done to enhance its security because of the misconception that such a network is inherently secured. 
The connectivity of SCADA networks increases the risk of cyber-attacks and hence there is a need to 
improve the security of these networks. SCADA systems are rarely patched or updated as engineers 
are often hesitant to do so due to concerns that the patch itself could potentially adversely impact the 
operation of the system [37]. The authors in [27] highlighted the security challenges of cloud-assisted 
IoT-based SCADA systems and provided recommendations and best practices for improving and 
maintaining their security. MacDermott et al. [37] investigated the factors that need to be taken into 
consideration when CI services are hosted in a cloud environment. The authors detailed some 
security concerns and existing protection methods. Piggin [38] discussed the opportunities and risks 
associated with the migration of SCADA and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) to cloud-based 
environments. In CI systems, the introduction of the six Trusted Computing elements [39] into cloud 
computing could possibly help to further strengthen the security of these systems. This is still seen 
as a new undeveloped solution for secure computing, albeit several research studies have already 
aimed at designing and developing trusted cloud computing services [40]. One (obvious) area where 
trusted cloud computing can be applied is in the protection of the underlying infrastructure, 
including the data centers and interconnected networks. The deployment of encrypted data storage, 
memory curtaining, and protected execution environments, based on some particular form of the 
trusted platform module (TPM) architecture, could make a substantial contribution in isolating and 
securing cloud resources in virtualized environments [40].  
In a typical SCADA-based IoT infrastructure, an increasing number of connected smart devices, 
with potential security vulnerabilities, can request communication with cloud resources for data 
storage and retrieval. As mentioned previously, the IoT inherits the same monitoring requirements 
from cloud computing, but the related challenges are further affected by volume, variety, and 
velocity characteristics of IoT data. One single weak link in the security chain could provide attackers 
with doorways that could potentially be unlocked and lead to data breach [41][42]. Alrawais et al. 
[43] discussed the security and privacy issues in IoT environments and proposed a method that 
employs fog computing to improve the distribution of certificate revocation information among IoT 
devices for security enhancement. Dsouza et al. [1] proposed a policy-driven security management 
approach for fog resources including policy analysis and its integration with the fog paradigm. 
However, the approach fails to consider rights inheritance or propagation of rights in the ecosystem 
[44][45]. Stojmenovic et al. [45] presented a survey of fog applications and the associated security 
challenges. In particular, the authors analyzed man-in-the-middle attacks in the context of fog 
computing where fog devices can be compromised or replaced by fake ones. This paper takes one 
step further to explore the design and implementation aspects of practical solutions to enhance the 
security and privacy of cloud-enabled IoT-based SCADA systems at the fog level. This will enable 
the fog paradigm to offer not only a balanced mix of enhanced computation power and connectivity 
but also provide an adequate level of security to counter cyber-attacks. 
4. An Integrated Approach to Secure cloud-enabled IoT-based SCADA CI 
The integration of SCADA and CI systems into IoT infrastructures gave rise to new security 
challenges that warrant further investigation. These challenges motivated us to explore a new 
approach towards an integrated secure fog platform that aims to address most of the security 
concerns in cloud-enabled IoT-based SCADA critical infrastructures. In the subsequent sections, we 
present in detail our integrated approach. We first analyse the security and performance 
requirements of SCADA CI systems and then outline the main features and functionalities of the 
proposed platform. 
4.1. Critical Infrastructure Requirements 
A major concern for moving CI data into a cloud computing environment relates to the stringent 
requirement for high security, low latency/quick response and high service availability. Whilst it is 
unlikely that CI providers will migrate their mission-critical services to public cloud environments, 
support systems and tertiary services, on the other hand, may be good candidate for cloud hosting. 
In this case, the main requirements involve: (a) real time support to guarantee a high level of 
availability in case of faults or intermittent connectivity problems; (b) scalability to cope with large 
volumes of data transfer at variable rates without compromising performance; (c) infrastructure 
security to protect data both at rest in the cloud and in transit; (d) high availability (e.g., reliability 
and resilience to reduce interruption); (e) least charges of transitioning and maintaining the cloud 
service; (f) dynamic provisioning to adapt to varying workloads and to cope with spikes and flash 
crowds; and (g) legal assurances that the customer can specify and receive a fine degree of control 
over the service hosting and the data replication strategy as stipulated by the service level agreement 
(SLA). 
While many of the abovementioned requirements can be convened by cloud computing 
solutions, there are several well-known issues that are potentially precarious with CIs. Among the 
most critical concerns is the relative lack of strong security and user authentication in typical cloud 
platforms and the limited control and monitoring of data replication and service location inside the 
cloud. A data-centric security approach must ensure that data protection mechanisms are deployed 
across all provided security solutions, and that data owners have the full control over authentication 
and authorization rights and privileges. Institutional security policies and access rules can be 
specified and mapped to the cloud environment. Requirement based security issues can be different 
for CI applications and for common IT applications but need to be considered in combination for the 
given context [46]. With this in mind, our proposed platform is detailed below.  
4.2. Platform Features and Functionality 
The main feature of the proposed platform is supporting the migration of SCADA services to a 
secured IoT-cloud platform via a new secured fog computing layer. The assumption used in the 
proposed approach is that all the connected systems in the cloud environment provide their 
functionalities (integrated or atomic) as-a-service that can be further composed by and interacted 
with other systems’ components subscribed to the cloud. The access to these services and 
communications (i.e., sending and receiving signals/data) will be enabled by the new added, secured 
fog layer. The platform will reinforce data integrity and security to minimize the risk that mission 
critical services will be interrupted or affected by security attacks. In addition, the platform alleviates 
the need to check the validity of sending/receiving certificates, which slows down the communication 
process noticeably in an IoT environment due to the huge amount of frequent communication. We 
do so by encrypting the certificates at the fog layer, hence there is no need to check for the validity of 
these encrypted certificates every time they are in use. 
To achieve our objectives, we propose three key services at the fog layer, Planning services, End-
to-End Security services, and Monitoring and Policing services. These services will be presented in the 
context of a ‘security toolbox’ that will be hosted at the fog layer and allows the platform to be adopted 
and deployed as main components by a range of cloud providers and users to allow secured 
communication, as illustrated in Figure 1. However, this paper focuses mainly on the End-to-End 
Security services with the encrypted access approach to the cloud services using identity-based 
cryptography and identity-based signature. 
Specialized unified threat management (UTM) systems will be deployed in order to secure the 
cloud against potential attacks and this will be complemented with resilient networking services, 
based on Software Defined Networking (SDN) mechanisms to counter recognized attack patterns. 
For the purpose of end-to-end security, we exploit two cryptographic schemes to encrypt the user 
communications and messages to the cloud. The main advantage is the provision of a trusted and 
secured public key generator, which will be part of our security toolbox, at the fog layer. This can 
potentially upsurge the security rigidity and reduce key management burden by eliminating the 
traditional need for a trusted third party to generate a public key.  
 Figure 1: High-level overview of the proposed fog-based Toolbox 
 
5. High-level Description of the Proposed Cryptographic Schemes 
Based on the platform features and functionalities, the following scenario depicted in Figure 1 
is considered. At the top of the hierarchy is the main cloud, which comprises power stations, 
distribution services, and management services and operations (e.g., SCADA services integrated into 
the cloud). There are regional “core” network nodes under the cloud layer, and “neighborhood” nodes 
that both constitute part of the secured pathway to the cloud. The fog nodes come under the 
neighborhood nodes, and are intermediary arranged between IoT devices and cloud servers taking 
cloud computing to the edge of the network. The security toolbox is part of the Eucalyptus 
dashboard, which is hosted between the thing layer and fog layer to facilitate the 
encryption/decryption of services offered at the fog layer.  These cryptographic services imply that 
all requests from IoT devices must go through it first to authenticate, encrypt and assigns keys 
accordingly. This will help to eliminate the requirement for checking the validity of sending/receiving 
certificates, which slows down the communication process. Two well-established cryptographic 
schemes will be available, namely “identity-based encryption”, and “identity-based signature”. Moreover, 
the fog nodes provide several general user services and computing resources, managing and 
controlling connected devices in the region and process information received from the IoT devices. 
The IoT generated data that is encrypted by the cryptographic services at fog layer is forwarded to 
the cloud via “neighborhood” nodes and regional “core” network nodes.  
In traditional scenarios, the identity-based encryption scheme requires a “trusted” external party, 
dubbed a Private Key Generator (PKG) who generates a secret master key (mk) and a public 
parameter (params) from selected security parameters denoted in our model by (Ω). In our proposed 
platform, the PKG will be located in the fog layer as part of the proposed End-to-End Security 
Toolbox service for three main reasons:  
a. In traditional systems, the PKG is identified as the main contributor in slowing down the 
communication process. Because of network delays, delivering the master key and 
associated parameters to other trusted parties is time consuming. Hence, there is a need 
to keep the PKG as close as possible to those parties. To this end, the usage of the fog layer 
becomes an appealing solution.   
b. As mentioned above, the PKG needs to be a trusted third party, in which case there might 
be a long path (i.e., multiple hops) between the PKG and the user(s), which increases the 
security concerns and risks. In contrast, if the PKG is located in the fog layer, it will take 
a single hop from the sender and a secured channel can then be established between the 
PKG and the users to prevent eavesdropping.  
c. One of the key issues in deploying security solutions based on public key cryptography 
is the high cost of maintaining the involved key infrastructure. As such, we argue that 
adopting identity-based cryptography and hosting the PKG in the fog layer offer a cost-
effective security solution.  
As illustrated in Figure 2, the params will be given to every beneficiary in the system including 
the sender and receiver. First the receiver authenticates him/herself to the PKG by submitting his/her 
identity, denoted by IDrec, which can be any string such as an email address, a telephone number, etc. 
Next, the PKG computes the private key KIDrec associated with IDrec identities by running the private 
key extraction algorithm (Extract in Figure 2) and by providing its master secret key mk and params 
as input.  
In this scenario, any sender who possesses IDrec and params, can encrypt a plain message M into 
a cipher text C using the Encrypt algorithm. Once C is delivered, the receiver decrypts it using Decrypt 
algorithm with the private key KIDrec (obtained previously from the PKG) as input. Figure 2 depicts 
the essential operations of the proposed identity-based encryption scheme.  
Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 3, when the signer submits his/her identity IDsig, the PKG 
computes the private key KIDsig associated with IDsig using the (Extract) with the master secret key mk 
and a public parameter (params) from selected entered security parameters denoted in our model by 
(Ω). Using KIDsig, the signer can obviously sign a message M to create a signature s using the (Sign) 
algorithm. Providing the message M, the signer’s identity IDsig, and the signature s, any party (i.e., 
verifier) can validate the signature s by running Verify.  
In summary, our approach ensures that a user, with a registered identifier and who possesses 
the corresponding private key will be the only one who can decrypt or produce a valid signature, 
even if the fog node is accessible by other users. This approach ensures authentication of the user and 
protects the message from modification thus helping to maintain data integrity while in transit.  
 
 Figure 2: Identity-based encryption on the fog 
6. Prototype Implementation 
6.1. Experimental Setup 
A prototype has been built based on Eucalyptus1 open-source solution, which provides the 
necessary infrastructure components as a service to the users of the platform. On top of Eucalyptus, 
we provide the proposed platform services, as shown in Figure 1. We used Java as a programming 
language and NetBeans 8.2 with Payara Server 5.181 as the Integrated Development Environment 
(IDE) in order to implement the proposed prototype. The experiments were run on an Apple iMac 
(Retina 5K display, 4.2 GHz Intel Core i7, and 46 GB 2400 MHz DDR4). In addition, the 
encryption/decryption services of the system were built using JPair2, which allows bilinear pairing 
with the cloud via Eucalyptus. The encryption/decryption services are hosted on the fog layer, which 
implies that all requests must go through it first in order to authenticate, encrypt and assigns keys 
accordingly.  
Eucalyptus provides a control panel (i.e., dashboard) for remotely hosted resources. This light-
weight dashboard application is installed on the user's machine. Via this dashboard, the user can 
                                                 
1 Is an open-source cloud software for creating AWS based private, public and hybrid cloud computing environment and services 
2 Java-based cryptographic library available online at http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/changyu.dong/jpair/intro.html  
specify the resource(s) needed (including what, when, where, and by whom). Therefore, a full 
description of the requested resource(s) on the cloud end will be provided. Then, the system 
generates a resource “workflow” to launch the corresponding resources with the proper set of 
parameter values at the time specified. In the subsequent sections, we present the implementation 
details of a prototype of our Secure Fog-based Platform (SeFoP) and we will validate it through 
simulations. 
 
Figure 3: Identity-based signature on the fog 
6.2. System Design and Implementation 
The proposed SeFoP has been implemented based on the system architecture depicted in Figures 
1, 2 and 3.  The following features/services were implemented in SeFoP on top of Eucalyptus: 
a. Add/delete identity: This enables all system components that are involved in sending and 
receiving data (including senders and receivers and other resources in the system), to 
add/register their IDs before they will be able to use/communicate-with other system 
components. This can be done via addResource method as illustrated in Figure 4. Once a new 
component’s ID has been registered, the private key for that object will be created in the 
form of KIDsig as shown in Figure 3. In the same vein, if the component is no longer 
available, its ID can be removed from the system using the deleteResource method in which 
case that the particular component will not be able to send/receive messages (or use the 
system) thereafter.  
b. Request encryption/decryption: Once a receiver registers its identity, the created ID will be 
available as a (Public key), which can be used by any sender (as a Private key) to direct the 
message to that particular entity. Accordingly, data will be encrypted using the private key 
of the receiver before being sent. This ensures that even if the data is interrupted, it will not 
be readable by the interceptors. This is made possible by using the receiver’s registered ID 
as a private key to encrypt the message. Once the receiver who holds the private key receives 
the message, he is the only entity that can decipher the message using its private key.  
These services are designed to be integrated as part of the fog-based user’s application so that 
the user can seamlessly send requests to access designated SCADA nodes or services in the cloud. 
Algorithm 1 details how the encryption and decryption requests will be performed in SeFoP. 
(Procedure 1 – Request Encryption) starts in lines 2 and 3 with initiating a user requests (ur) and a 
Virtual Machine (vm). The request will then be sent to a fog node in Fn where Fn = {f1, f2, f3,.., fn} for 
encryption as per line 4. The Encrypt function (lines 5-12) encrypts the incoming request using the IP 
address of the desired server (sip). Using sip helps in implementing 3-levels encryption: (1) adding 
more elements (i.e., bytes) to the request via inserting the IP of the server (addBytes, line 8), (2) shifting 
the elements (shiftRows, line 9) by the size of sip; and, (3) mixing the elements of the massage via 
(mixColumns, line 10). (Procedure 2 – Request Decryption) works in a reverse-wise, as shown in (lines 
15-24). The decryption is achieved by removing and reversing the elements of the request message, 
thus only the server with the correct IP address reads the message correctly.  
 
 
 Figure 4: SeFoP Service Implementation 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed SeFoP at runtime, it is important to benchmark the 
results against well-established and published models. Therefore, the Multi-level User Access 
Control Layer (MLAC) [47] scheme for adding additional security/authentication layer on the cloud 
was considered as a benchmark for the purpose of performance comparison. It should be noted that 
we use identical simulation parameters of MLAC in order to achieve a systematic and consistent 
performance comparison. Hence, we consider a specific scenario of adding and removing VMs and 
storage on a specific server on the cloud and then we monitor and compare the response time of 
adding and removing these resources under three scenarios: the proposed SeFoP approach, the 
MLAC approach [47], and the no security approach.   
Suppose that a user with ID “USR150” sends a request to create a VM with certain specifications 
on server hosted on a public cloud and identified by a string “CL-ID004”. The user’s request in this 
system will be “VMID:VM1234, CPU:512MHs, Memory:512MB, Desk:1024MB”. As such, the scenario 
works in the following sequence:  
 First, all servers on the cloud will register their identity using the Add identity service. 
Afterwards, a private key will be generated for each server on the fog layer, using the ID of 
that server.  
 The user sends the request to a particular server via the fog layer, using the request encryption 
service.  
 Finally, the server uses its private key to decipher the cipher request via decrypt request.   
7. Discussion and Evaluation Results 
Although a fully completed evaluation of the proposed platform is underway, some preliminary 
results for the execution of the proposed “SeFoP” features will be presented in this section. The 
following testing was conducted primarily to monitor the response-time of adding and removing 
VM(s) with SeFoP and to compare the results against those obtained with the MLAC approach [47], 
and those obtained with no implemented security features. Evidently, introducing a new behavior 
(SeFoP in this case) to the service has a direct performance impact due to the additional overhead 
associated with the additional code interpretation needed to execute and link the new service. 
However, given that SeFoP is presented as part of the fog main functions (i.e., embedded as part of 
the connection network), it does not have any negative impact on the system performance; but 
showed performance improvement instead. Hence, it is suitable for real-time critical systems in 
which the response time and latency are key factors. In fact, as may be seen in Figure 5, when adding 
or removing cloud resources (VMs and storage in our case), the overall system performance improves 
with SeFoP compared to MLAC, and this performance is remarkably comparable to a that of a plain-
text solution approach (i.e., with no security features). This is because the new added SeFoP 
framework is available on the route between the user and the cloud data center (i.e., fog layer); it is 
not outsourced to a third party. In Figure 5, the dark grey bars represent the response time (in msec) 
of the application using SeFoP, while the light bar in the middle represents the application response-
time with MLAC. 
 
Figure 5: Overheads of Interacting with the Application: SeFoP vs MLAC vs no Security  
A further system performance testing has been conducted to compare the stability of the 
proposed SeFoP framework (when adding and removing resources from/to the cloud) against the 
corresponding results obtained with the MLAC and with the “no security” approaches. The results 
shown in Figure 6 showcase the relative robust stability of SeFoP when compared to the other two 
approaches.  
 Figure 6: System stability Comparison  
Finally, we compared the scalability of the system with and without SeFoP features. For this 
purpose, we, first, ran multiple simulations that involve an increasing number of VMs (5 – 50) and 
measured the overall performance with and without SeFoP. Our results, as shown in Figure 7, 
illustrate that compared to MLAC, the performance gain brought by SeFoP is around 2.8 seconds 
when adding 5 VMs and 3.2 seconds when adding 10 VMs; and it is less than 7 seconds in other 
instances. Then, we ran another experiment to evaluate performance of SeFoP against MLAC when 
adding an extreme number of VMs (1000 VMs) all at the same time. Although, the results/bars in 
Figure 8 show time difference among the three used approaches; however, this difference is a fraction 
of milliseconds and it is not noticeable by the end users. The total time needed to add 1000 VMs 
through SeFoP is around 112 seconds. As such, we are satisfied that, at this stage, our approach will 
not introduce any overhead over larger jobs on the cloud.  
 
Figure 7: System Scalability Comparison  
 Figure 8: System Scalability when Adding 1000 VMs  
8. Conclusions 
There is a clear need today for more proven secure platforms to facilitate the adoption and 
diffusion of IoT-based services among CI providers. This requires effective mechanisms to secure the 
distributed cloud services, the end-to-end interconnected network, and the overall fog infrastructure. 
These issues are now starting to be tackled based on existing enterprise-wide technologies on the 
basis that they can provide a reasonable level of assurance over the security of the platform while 
limiting the cost and complexity of the overall approach.  
In this paper, we have demonstrated how cloud computing and the fog layer can practically be 
made secure to support CI providers. In addition, we have proposed a dynamic and open platform 
to secure CI in hybrid cloud/fog environments, and we identified the main elements of a ‘security 
toolbox’ that providers can develop and deploy to orchestrate this process. Finally, to our knowledge, 
this is the first contribution that aims to explore the usage of identity-based cryptography and 
identity-based signature schemes within the fog layer, which was also substantiated by a 
performance evaluation simulation. Our future work will focus on validating the proposed approach 
against CI provider expectations and on further developing, integrating and evaluating the identified 
functionalities to comprehensively demonstrate the advantages of the proposed toolbox. 
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